Lessons for the PLP

Mon, Jul 3rd 2017, 09:43 AM

"While one may encounter many defeats, one must not be defeated." - Maya Angelou

The 2017 general election is over and the new Free National Movement (FNM) government has been installed. It has been 20 years since a political party has won two successive terms in office. The Bahamian people spoke loudly and clearly. They had, had enough of Perry Christie's Progressive Liberal Party (PLP) and wanted to see the backs of his government.
Never in the history of the country have the people spoken so summarily, decisively and forcefully. In May's election, the electorate returned only three PLP incumbents and elected a single new-comer, Chester Cooper, as compared to the 35 FNM candidates who were elected, many for the first time.
Never in the history of the country have the people not returned a sitting prime minister to office. And never have the PLP's strongest, and heretofore presumably "safe" seats, been so resolutely rejected and handed over to the former opposition.
Therefore, this week, we would like to Consider this...considering the near wipe-out of the PLP, what are some of the teachable moments and lessons that the PLP can garner from the 2017 general election?

The election results
The 2017 election results were instructive. According to the parliamentary commissioner's website, of the 181,543 registered voters, 160,409 or 88.3% went to the polls. Therefore, 11.7% of registered voters did not vote.
The FNM won 57% of the popular vote, garnering 91,137 votes compared to 37% or 59,164 votes that were cast for the PLP. The difference between the two major parties was 31,973 votes. Of the 175 candidates who contested the 2017 election, 97 lost their deposits.
The Democratic National Alliance (DNA) obtained only 7,537 votes or 4.7% of the votes cast, a notable decrease from the 8% that it obtained in the 2012 election. It was clear from the DNA's deteriorating performance that Bahamians did not want to take a chance of splitting their vote, which would have favored the PLP.
Equally instructive were the number of seats that had impressive majorities. There were only two seats in which the successful candidates won by less than 100 votes. There were also fifteen seats won by more than 1,000 votes. One of the largest margins of victory went to the new Prime Minister, Dr. Hubert Minnis, who won his seat by more than 3,094 votes over his PLP opponent, compared to the outgoing Prime Minister, Mr. Perry Christie, who was vanquished by his FNM victor, Mr. Chipman Reece, by the smallest margin of votes: 4.

The Greenberg Report of 2007
After its defeat in 2007, the PLP commissioned Greenberg Quinton Rossner, a polling and research firm, to assess its reasons for losing. In the report, Greenberg highlighted several "fundamental factors" that contributed to the PLP's loss. In 2017, there were many similarities to Greenberg's 2007 report.
Those "fundamental factors" included (1) the PLP's failure to expand its base, (2) the party's inability to "take concrete actions that conveyed its seriousness about purging corruption from the party and the state", and (3) Mr. Christie's leadership style "which voters equate with weakness".
Greenberg noted, "There is a perception among voters that the PLP has become more focused on doing things that benefit its own politicians than for people." Sounds chillingly close to the characterization of Christie's recent administration.
Greenberg also suggested that, since the PLP lost the 2007 election, instead of only criticizing the government in its role in opposition in the five years ahead, it needed "to promote a progressive social agenda".
The PLP made the catastrophically calamitous mistake of not taking that 2007 report seriously. Some senior former ministers and party elders did not even want to debate the report internally. How short-sighted! Had an honest exercise and analysis been performed regarding the party's failure in 2007, perhaps some of the mistakes could have been avoided during the PLP's second, non-consecutive term that came to a crashing conclusion on May 10, 2017.
However, the party leadership adopted the proverbial ostrich posture of "burying its head in the sand", both in 2007 and for much of its recent disastrous term in office. Despite the many cautions and warnings proffered by long-standing, senior, dedicated party supporters, Mr. Christie and many of his ministers repeatedly ignored the calls for reform.
One of the most preposterously perplexing pronouncements by a senior minister who lost his seat on May 10, was that the PLP should not spend too much time analyzing what went wrong. That monumental mistake was made in 2007 and should not be repeated.

Lessons that should be learned
There are many important lessons that the PLP should learn from this recent contest. Those lessons include the urgent need within the party for brutal honesty in recognizing and owning the mistakes and missteps of its administration. Those included a deep-seated shroud of secrecy that enveloped some of its policies and practices, demonstrating complete disregard for transparency and accountability.
Secondly, there was a pervasive perception by the populace that some members of the PLP government were steeped in conflicts of interest and corruption. Only one single Minister, Mr. Damian Gomez, was brave enough to call out such practices. Perhaps that was one of the reasons he was deprived of a nomination in the last election. The PLP has habitually ostracized those who sound the warning of impending doom.
No one has ever successfully accused the prime minister of corruption in his forty-plus years in office. However, either he knew what his corrupt, conflicted or compromised ministers were doing all around him and did nothing, which plays into the narrative of being a weak leader, or he was ignorant about what was taking place, a proposition that few Bahamians would find credible. Errors and sins of omission often trump those that are committed.
Third, many PLP members of Parliament (MPs) had become so disconnected from the people who elected them, that one veteran PLP candidate admitted on election day that he no longer recognized many of the voters whose support he was seeking.
Fourth, MPs failed to recognize that their loyalty was owed to the country first, then the party and then the leader. Too many MPs acknowledged that Mr. Christie had become a drag on the PLP, but refused to honestly confront this reality. The obsequious obeisance that political minions, hangers-on and sycophants paid to the leader, along with the blind faith that they placed in him, greatly contributed to the party's performance at the polls. This behavior must never be repeated if the party ever hopes to regain the trust of the Bahamian people.
Fifth, the wanton hypocrisy demonstrated by some lawmakers who themselves ignored and, in some instances, violated the law by, for example, ignoring the legal requirement for filing their public disclosures, irked many Bahamians.
Sixth, the last-minute efforts to win votes by awarding enormous contracts, at great expense to the public purse, in the run-up to the election galled many voters. It was clear that a last-ditch effort to buy votes was being attempted.
Seventh, the PLP did nothing to instill or inspire confidence in a government that blatantly ignored the will of the people, such as in the case of the gaming referendum.
Above all, the government's failure to adequately engage the public on so many issues, such as the Freedom of Information Act, the Baha Mar debacle, the National Intelligence Agency and others, depreciated its political currency with the electorate.
When a thorough post-mortem is conducted, if the PLP has the courage to perform an autopsy on its term in office, there will undoubtedly be other examples of how poorly the PLP governed in the last five years.

Seeking forgiveness
Until and unless the PLP, squanderers of the people's trust in so many ways, admits to its shortcomings and asks the public's forgiveness for its many mistakes and missteps, the party's road to recovery will be rugged, long, and, perhaps, never-ending.

Rebuilding, redefining,
rebounding, rebranding and re-engineering
In order to rebound from its defeat and rebuild the trust that it squandered during its term in office, the PLP must rebrand itself as a popular political party. It must redefine its vision, re-engineer its organization and must once again become relevant to the electorate.
In order to clearly demonstrate that it has heard the voice of the people, the PLP should immediately begin by accepting the resignation of its national chairman who equally bears responsibility for the party's rejection. Furthermore, what is urgently required is a more benign, less belligerent and bellicose national spokesman, whose primary responsibility would be to heal the wounds that were, and continue to be, inflicted on the party and to rebuild the party's organization. The entire party leadership must be reconstituted to address the new demands of what needs to be a modern, dynamic, restructured 21st century political organization.
Above all, the PLP must reacquaint itself with its core values from which it has so diametrically deviated. It must refine its vision, recasting its message so it becomes relevant to the needs of the people who the party hopes to represent.

Conclusion
The PLP has a rich and commendable history and we believe that its best days lie ahead. If it truly learns from its mistakes and rediscovers its moral compass, the PLP could present itself again as the best hope for scores of those Bahamians who, for so many decades, reposed their trust and confidence in the PLP and welcome them home again.

o Philip C. Galanis is the managing partner of HLB Galanis and Co., Chartered Accountants, Forensic & Litigation Support Services. He served 15 years in Parliament. Please send your comments to pgalanis@gmail.com.

Click here to read more at The Nassau Guardian

 Sponsored Ads