On December 12, 2014, the permanent council of the Organization of American States (OAS) decided that a new Secretary General and Assistant Secretary General are to be elected on March 18, 2015. This will be the first time that these elections will be held simultaneously, and will mean the end of José Miguel Insulza’s tenure as the current Secretary General, having occupied the position for 10 years (he cannot run for a third term in office).
The elections will be very important on this occasion and will reflect the tensions that divide the hemisphere. The results of these elections are likely to have important consequences for how the historically-weak OAS will be managed through a particularly tense period of years, because the future of the institutions and the nature of the organization will be at stake.
Imperialist roots and prospect for the revitalization of the OAS
The Inter-American system has its earliest origins in 1826, following the successful independence movements in the Americas, with an early hemispheric meeting initiative on the part of Simon Bolivar and Panama’s Congress. However, it was not until 1889, in Washington D.C., that the American States began to meet periodically and to build a system of norms and institutions to discuss the adoption of some regional arbitration plan, the settlement of disagreements by utilizing dialogue to solve the conflicts between Western hemisphere countries. This system was later recast as the “Pan American Union” and, in 1948, became the OAS.
The OAS is a hemispheric body charged with promoting peaceful settlement of disputes, displaying inter-American solidarity during periods of conflict, and promoting democracy throughout the Americas. However, throughout the Cold War, the OAS repeatedly failed to fulfill these duties when the US government installed and supported strongman regimes throughout the Americas.
Even the Inter-American treaty for Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR, Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Reciproca), ensuring respective support by member states in case of war, did not apply during the 1970s when the U.S. government backed the Pinochet coup in Chile, or when the United Kingdom and Argentina clashed over the Falklands/Malouines islands, in 1982. Moreover, because of deep divisions within the body, the TIAR excluded Cuba in the name of anti-communism in 1959, and TIAR was controversially not applied during the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1962.
In the 1990s, after the Cold War began to wind down, the OAS went through a “revitalization” process, with the implementation of a new set of mechanisms designed to support democratic processes. This renewal afforded the body greater relevance, and with the end of the Cold War, the US government began to show less interest in interfering in the Americas through (or independently of) the OAS.
The OAS also began to focus more on human rights and democratic procedures through the establishment of the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights (IACHR), and the promotion of Electoral Missions throughout the Americas. This movement led to high expectations. This new inter-American system became more independent from Washington, through the promotion of real peace and efficient dialogue. This dramatic shift has been illustrated by the election of more qualified OAS secretaries general.
Washington’s relationship with the OAS
Before 2004, the selection of the OAS Secretary General was largely pre-approved by the US government. Examples include former Colombian President Gaviria (1994-2004) and former Costa Rican president Miguel Angel Rodriguez (2004). The latter was in office for little over a month before he was dismissed over allegations of corruption during his tenure as president, and subsequently sentenced to five years in jail in 2011.
In 2004, after the former Costa Rican president’s brief term in office, Washington chose to back former president of El Salvador Francisco Floras, for the position of secretary general (SG), before ultimately withdrawing its support. The first round of voting gave an advantage to Mexican Foreign Minister Luis Ernesto Deberz, backed by a number of North and Central American countries, who ran against former Minister of the Interior in Chile, José Miguel Insulza, who was supported by most South American governments.
Near the end, Deberz withdrew, and Insulza was elected on May 2005. In the election, only Mexico abstained while Bolivia and Peru voted against Insulza because of their historic tensions with Chile. This was the first time that a SG was elected without being pre-approved by the U.S.
Mr. Insulza was reelected in 2010 for a second five-year term. His leadership has been linked with substantial autonomy from Washington, accompanied by a commitment to revitalization started under former Secretary General Gaviria.
Nevertheless, Washington’s residual influence on the OAS is best reflected by its more-than-significant financial contributions to the US-based entity. The OAS is financed by two kinds of funds. First, a regular fund, which is the budget of the OAS, and is filled by internal levers applied by member states in proportion to their respective Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
Hence, it comes as no surprise that the US government provides nearly 60 percent of the OAS regular budget, with the Canadian government accounting for nearly 12 percent. Comparatively, the governments of Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and Venezuela provide a combined 22.5 percent.
The regular fund is approved by the General Assembly, and in 2014 it was $83 million USD. Every other member state contributes little more than a symbolic amount to the organization. In light of this disparity, it is unsurprising that the US and Canada have a greater amount of influence within the organization.
The OAS also receives special donations in order to complete its necessary budget. Member states contribute 63 percent and observer states (such as Italy, France, Spain, South Korea, etc.) account for 25 percent. Donations from other institutions and the private sector also help to finance the OAS’s specific funds.
However, nearly 90 percent of the member states’ contributions for these specific funds are made by the U.S. and Canadian governments, which are designated by the US$27 million and US$13 million earmarked, respectively, by the North American States. The option to provide “extra-funds” is very useful for Washington and Ottawa because these specific funds are administrated by the donors, who choose to finance a specific OAS program. For example the Secretariat for Multidimensional Security (SSM, Secretaria de Seguridad Multidimensional) receives only eight percent of the regular fund, but nearly 30 percent of the funds allocated to it, principally contributed by the U.S. government. The top executive of the SSM is currently a Canadian, Adam Blackwell.
This difference shows the priority of the U.S. government gives security issues, specifically the War on Drugs, through the use of specific funds. The U.S. government is able to directly influence the programs operated by the OAS. Currently, the Secretary for Political Affairs is greatly dependent on donations from Canada through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).
In other words, despite the democratic system of one vote per member state, the United States and Canada carry much more influence. Hypothetically speaking, if Washington chooses in the near future to stop financing the OAS, this vital tool of the inter-American system may collapse.
On the other hand, it is safe to say that the Secretary General, whoever he or she may be, will never oppose receiving special funding from individual governments as this allows the organization to carry out more initiatives. Given this win-win relationship, Washington will retain its influence over the OAS, even if this is not as clear and evident as before.
• Clemént Doleac is a research associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs.
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