U.S.-Haitian relations are at least 100 years old, during which time Haitians have not seemed to develop a meaningful trust in U.S. intentions. Throughout this long relationship, the United States, together with the international community, has often contributed to Haiti’s political sphere. For example, when President Aristide was overthrown in a 1991 military coup supported by the Haitian elite, the Organization of American States (OAS) placed economic sanctions and embargos on Haiti, limiting economic relations with most of the hemisphere in efforts to bring back Aristide.
Aristide returned in 1994 and served as president again from 2001 to 2004, when he was forced into exile by a popular uprising. In 2006, the New York Times interviewed Haitians during a rally, and many of those interviewed believed that President Aristide had been kidnapped. His supporters wanted him back as the only hope for a better future in a country that has been suffering hunger for 200 years. President Aristide’s removal spurred anti-American feelings among Haitians due to alleged U.S. involvement.
Later in 2010, the U.S. Embassy in Haiti condemned the first round of election results amid widespread allegations that President Préval and Pierre-Louis Opont, director of the election commission, were involved in altering the original results and were accused of being in favor of Jude Celestin, who came second before Michel Martelly. In late January 2011, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton traveled to Haiti to make sure that the votes of the Haitians were being tabulated. In the end, with the recommendation of the OAS, Michel Martelly was awarded a position in a run-off election, officially replacing Celestin, who had dropped out of the race, despite his performance in attracting a number of votes.
After the second-round contest and an exceptionally low turnout, Martelly was elected Haiti’s president. Email correspondence between former U.S. Ambassador to Haiti Kenneth Merten and key state department officers in Haiti, as well as his communications with Michel Martelly’s campaign staffers, revealed instances of U.S. intervention in the processes that accompanied the disputed elections of 2010.
Moreover, documents released through the Freedom of Information Act revealed that in 2011, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) allocated $100,000 to the Mouvement Tét Kale (MTK), which was a political organization that had backed Martelly’s election. The USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) funded the MTK candidate through a for-profit organization called Chemonics International. USAID policy says funding is supposed to be distributed equally to all political groups in Haiti on a non-partisan basis.
Nevertheless, as per stipulated contract with USAID, Chemonics specifically aims to protect U.S. foreign policy interests. Additionally, the 2009 Congressional Research Service says OTI operations have been shown to have “political entanglements that may have diplomatic implications”.
One question revolves around the extent to which USAID funds influenced the 2011 election results and ultimately facilitated Martelly’s ascension into the presidency. This election period was characterized by discontent and turmoil and put the U.S. under the spotlight, particularly by critics who questioned Washington’s ultimate intentions in pursuing its political agenda in Haiti.
Additionally, in October 2012, former President Bill Clinton, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, President Martelly, Prime Minister Lamothe and the President of the Inter-American Development Bank opened the Caracol Industrial Park in Haiti. This project was a centerpiece of U.S. reconstruction efforts in Haiti after the earthquake.
The Industrial Park primarily targets the creation of light manufacturing industries and was expected to immediately create 65,000 jobs by 2020, as well as become a new source of investment in rural Haiti outside of Port-au-Prince. So far, the Korean manufacturer Sae-A Trading Ltd, anchor tenant of the Caracol Industrial Park, has committed to a $78 million investment and currently employs some 4,500 Haitians. The company wants to hire 20,000 additional workers, which is still very much below the final goal of 65,000 jobs by 2020.
Additionally, U.S. foreign policy toward Haitian immigrants has not been consistent. In the past, the U.S. would welcome Haitian refugees on grounds of economic difficulties and political oppression. However, in the most recent years, Haitians refugees have encountered major difficulty being accepted in the United States. This change in attitude toward Haitians shows an enormous discrepancy on how the U.S. has been willing to treat Cuba’s immigrants, who can obtain asylum in a much easier manner.
Despite creating an expanded definition of the refugee law in 1980, the U.S. also created Executive Order 12807, which states that those asylum seekers who are stopped in the sea do not qualify for refugee protection. This order clearly bypasses the intention of the laws that were created to protect refugees. Moreover, the United States’ immigration policy shows immigrants are welcomed based on certain characteristics. Welcoming immigrants on humanitarian grounds may depend on nationality and interest-based factors.
For instance, the U.S. is more willing to accept immigrants coming from a country with anti-American politics or rivalry. This happens because accepting these immigrants shows that these citizens prefer the U.S. to their country of origin. The U.S.-Haiti relationship is a perfect example of the saying, “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” turning Haitians into a political tool. U.S. immigration policy toward Haiti has shown little regard for refugees themselves.
In order to be accepted to the United States, the Coast Guard uses a “shout test,” which aims to pick only the loudest ones for an asylum interview, based on the idea that those who are capable of “screaming” show that they need more help than those who are not sufficiently loud. Also, the Coast Guard does not need to have an interpreter; therefore, many Haitians do not even understand their rights when these are explained to them. In other words, Haitians’ application process for refugee status is very difficult compared to other refugee groups.
In contrast to Cuban asylum seekers, Haitian refugees are completely disregarded in the high seas. For example, the number of Cubans offered asylum in the U.S. in 2004 was 6,360, while the number of Haitians given asylum was only eight. Many of the Haitian refugees were turned around without even the chance of applying for asylum, also thanks to Executive Order 12807.
National security concerns might explain why Haitians have demonstrably more difficulty in being accepted to the United States. According to the U.S. government, stopping immigrants in the sea is a legitimate method of reducing smuggling issues. Also, traffickers or terrorists may pose as Haitians in order to entry in the United States. However, the question should be raised as to why Haitian nationality is more an indicator of being a smuggler or a terrorist than a Haitian refugee.
Final assessment
In its decision to extend the MINUSTAH mandate, the UN Security Council stated that Haiti is at a turning point in the democratization process. On one hand, political leaders as well as stakeholders need to compromise some of their expectations and goals for the sake of stability. On the other hand, Haitians should take greater responsibility for the status of their society. However, natural disasters aside, the Haitians have seen military dictatorships, presidents forced into exile and invasions by foreign powers come and go.
Even when their country was not directly invaded, foreign interventions often made the difference as to who should run the country and how. Additionally, never-ending peacekeeping operations have at times worsened Haitians’ lives. With these realities in mind, it is difficult to blame eligible voters for completely distancing themselves from their nation’s political life.
In order to carry out rigorous economic reforms and counteract inefficiencies in the public sector, Haiti needs a stable, functioning, and trustworthy government. That is also the recipe for attracting foreign investment and creating jobs. The U.S. and the international community should help Haiti develop politically through the fight against corruption by also denying support to political figures, who were known for being involved in illicit markets. Additionally, countries involved in Haiti, including the United States, should set aside narrow national interests for the sake of creating a better Haiti; a safer, stable, and more prosperous Haiti is the only likely way for Haiti’s investors to guarantee profit as well as the only way for Haitians to regain confidence in both their leaders and international community.
For the elections of October 25, the OAS deployed a large electoral observation mission composed of 125 international experts from 27 countries. According to the head of the OAS observation mission, former Brazilian Minister Celso Amorim, the October 25 election was a step forward and generated a greater voter turnout compared to the August 9 elections. Prime Minister Paul Evans said that the outcome of Election Day was satisfactory.
It is too early to see who won in the elections. According to the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), it may take until the end of November to release final results. At the same time, in order to ensure the election’s ultimate success, the Haitian National Police was forced to arrest 234 people, impound 13 firearms, as well as seize four vehicles.
As of October 26, the day after the second round of presidential elections, many Haitians were still doubtful any change could be brought by the elections. One week before the October elections, rival gangs supporting different political campaigns disseminated violence and intimidated citizens. Isaih Jenty lost his seven-months-pregnant-wife due to one of these gangs’ assaults. Jenty, just as many other Haitians, wants a real change that can only come about eliminating criminality.
Seeing a real positive change may encourage Haitians to regain a certain sense of confidence in their leaders and hope for a better and brighter future. This may finally spur Haitians’ desires to take more responsibility in the country’s success through their more intense political participation.
• Elena Tiralongo with collaboration from Gvaram Khandamishvili, research associated at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs. Part 1 of this column can be read at: www.thenassauguardian.com/opinion/op-ed.
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